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In this paper we study the plausibility of 
navigation relevant AIS parameter based on time 
series analysis of HELCOM AIS data, obtained 
during September 2011. Previous analysis[1] of AIS 
data sets were mainly based on studies of not 
known or not existent (default) values in the AIS 
messages. The results of these studies have 
shown that especially true heading (THDG) and 
rate of turn (ROT) parameters were strongly 
affected by default / unknown values. We discuss 
algorithms to evaluate the plausibility of data 
contained in the AIS message for dynamic data, 
like time, position, speed, and course.  The 
contained information is checked against the 
plausibility of their values according to other 
parameters in the time series. For example the 
speed can be calculated from the two position 
information from the AIS message and the time 
difference between these positions. The dynamic 
data is consistent in this case when both the 
calculated and the measured value are similar 
within an appropriate limit. For static data the 
determination of plausibility is based on checks 
against the AIS specification. The obtained results 
will serve as error model for the development of a 
maritime traffic situation assessment facility, 
where AIS, radar and specific PNT data shall be 
fused together to create a reliable traffic situation 
image. 
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I. INTRODUCTION (THIS IS ‘HEADER 1’) 
One of the important carriers of the worldwide 
economy is the transport of goods and persons realized 
by vessels. A rapid development of new technologies 
for the maritime traffic system occurred in the last 
decades to enable the handling of increased transport 
volume and to improve the safety. To harmonize the 
developments of electronic aids to navigation and 
dedicated systems and services aboard and ashore the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) has initiated 
the e-Navigation strategy to integrate existing and new 
navigational tools, in particular electronic tools, in an 
all-embracing system. 
With the introduction of the Automatic Identification 
System (AIS) an important element was established 
improving safety at sea, making bridge watchkeeping 
duties more comfortable and enhancing vessel traffic 
management ashore. Its usage worldwide is 
widespread. As the Safety of Life at Sea Conventions 
(SOLAS)[2] state, all vessels of 300 gross tonnage and 
upwards engaged on international voyages, cargo 
vessels of 500 gross tonnage and upwards not 
engaged on international voyages and both passenger 
vessels and vessels carrying dangerous cargo 
irrespective of size shall be fitted with an AIS 
transponder[2]. According to the Lloyd’s List 
Intelligence, which is running the world’s largest land 
and satellite based AIS monitoring network, there are 
currently about 72.000 vessels worldwide equipped 
with active AIS transponders. [5]. 
The risk reduction of accidents between ships as 
well as ships and obstacles is the social goal 
associated with safe shipping from berth to berth. The 
technological goal covers the development of new tools 
and methods to avoid safety-critical events and to 
support ship-side and shore-side crews during decision 
making in complicated and complex navigational 
situations. The avoidance of collisions and groundings 
is only possible, if reliable and comprehensive 
information of the maritime traffic situation is available. 
II. CONCEPT 
The general quality of AIS data depends on 
performance of the navigational instruments of a target 
vessel and radio wave propagation during data 
broadcast. While the quality of the in the AIS message 
contained data depends on the performance of on-
board devices like the gyro compass or the GNSS 
receiver and the input of the nautical staff. As the 
analysis of electromagnetic interference is beyond the 
scope of this work, the quality of the on-board data 
sources is to be examined closely. However, it is not 
possible to gather full information on the state of the 
equipment, which is responsible for data provision on a 
vessel, because this kind of data is not contained in the 
AIS message. This also makes it impossible to fully 
identify possible errors of telemetry computations or to 
detect software bugs affecting them. The only chance 
to figure out, how plausible the data is, seems to be the 
analysis at the AIS receiver side. The challenge is 
about finding reasonable proof of faulty data received 
from an AIS transmitter and computing the impact it 
could have on proper decision making.  
The strategy of this paper to estimate the 
plausibility of the in the AIS message contained data is 
illustrated in Figure 1. We use the HELCOM (Helsinki 
Commission) data from September 2011 with excellent 
coverage of the Baltic Sea. The data is pre-processed 
which includes the decoding, sorting and storage. The 
next step after the pre-processing of the data is the 
analysis of the received AIS messages according to 
the algorithms described in section 3. The last part of 
the paper gives the results of this analysis in section 4 
and the summary as well as an outlook in section 5. 
III. ANALYZED PLAUSIBILITY OF DYNAMIC AIS DATA 
This section explains the possible zero level 
plausibility checks for dynamic AIS data of COG, SOG, 
position, heading, navigational status, update rate and 
the static AIS data of the IMO-number. 
A. Course over ground (COG) 
The plausibility of the course over ground is 
checked with the information of two position reports. 
Assuming that the positions reports are accurate to a 
certain level it is possible to check the consistency of 
the course over ground (COG) information. Let’s 
consider a case, where the COG information has not 
changed between two AIS messages.  A plausible AIS 
message would exist, if the angle calculated from the 
two position reports is comparable to the reported COG 
(see Figure 3). 
 
B. Speed over ground (SOG) 
The integrity of the speed over ground information 
is checked similarly to the course over ground 
information. Assuming that the position information is 
correct it is possible to check the consistency of the 
speed over ground. The two positions and the time 
passed during these two reports are used to calculate 
the average speed. This average speed is compared to 
the AIS information and the AIS message is considered 
to be correct if the following equation is true 
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Figure 3: This figure illustrates the situation of a single 
vessel for at during two times.  
Figure 2: This figure illustrates the strategy of the 
plausibility analysis 
Figure 1: This figure illustrates the concept of the paper 
where 1P
r
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are the positions and t∆  is the 
time passed between the two AIS messages, 
respectively (see Figure 3). An additional check of the 
SOG plausibility could be the rate at which the SOG 
value changes, meaning that the acceleration should 
be within reasonable values. This check against 
plausible accelerations is not done in this paper. 
C. Position 
The position report is crucial to check the integrity 
of the AIS messages of SOG and COG. It is therefore 
important to quantify the position report accuracy. The 
complication is that it would not make much sense to 
use the information of SOG or COG since we assume 
that the position report is correct to check for the 
consistency of these two messages and therefore the 
absolute error estimate would identical with opposite 
sign. In this paper we use the continuity of the 
trajectory of ship travel routes. This means that the 
position reports should be free of jumps bigger than a 
given threshold which is motivated by the average 
speed (5 m/s) and average update rate (6 - 10 
seconds) of vessels and AIS messages, respectively. 
This results in a maximal difference between two points 
of 30 to 60 meters. With the assumption that not more 
than 10 AIS messages are missing reasonable position 
differences are between 300 and 600 meters. In this 
paper a position report is considered critical if the 
difference between two points is larger than 500 
meters. 
The position report consistency can be improved 
by adding additional external sensor information, like 
radar data. Note this paper focuses on determination of 
plausibility information without additional sensor data 
and possible improvements with data fusion 
algorithms. 
D. Heading 
The heading plausibility information can be divided 
into two categories. Mainly the ones with nonphysical 
data outside the range of 0 to 359 degrees, most 
probably the default value of 511. And the other, more 
challenging heading information, where a value inside 
the possible range of heading is sent, but it does not 
correspond to the physical condition of the vessel. In 
this paper we consider heading information as correct, 
if the difference to the COG data is smaller than the 
empirical chosen value of  20 degrees. The reasons for 
the threshold value instead of the exact value of COG 
are water currents or ship drifts resulting from wind or 
other possible sources. 
E. Navigational status 
The navigational status of a moored or anchored 
ship can be checked against the position, speed, COG 
and SOG information and should be consistent with a 
nonmoving, nonrotating vessel. On the other hand non 
anchored or moored ships should show some 
movement, which is implied by changing information of 
either position, rate of turn or speed.  
Table 1: AIS specification[4] of update rates 
depending on SOG and ROT 
Ships Dynamic condition Speed                                   [knots] 
Specified 
update 
rate [s] 
Ship at anchor or moored < 3 180 
Ship at anchor or moored > 3 10 
Moving 0 – 14 10 
Moving and changing course 0 – 14 3⅓ 
Moving 14 – 23 6 
Moving and changing course 14 – 23 2 
Moving > 23 2 
Moving and changing course > 23 2 
 
An additional way of checking the navigational 
status of anchored or moored ships is the cross 
correlation with a database of all ships anchored in a 
harbor, which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
F. Update rate 
The update rate is defined in the specifications and 
depends on the rate of turn, the speed and the 
navigational status of the vessel. The specified update 
rates for all possible ship conditions are shown in Table 
1. The strategy to check the plausibility of the update 
rate is illustrated in Figure 4.  
As the HELCOM database contains the times 
when the AIS messages were received. In addition 
Figure 4 This figure illustrates the strategy of the 
update rate plausibility analysis 
contain the dynamic AIS messages the necessary data 
of SOG and COG in order to check the performance of 
the AIS update rate by comparing the time difference of 
the received message with the specified update rate 
(Table 1). As illustrated in Figure 4. the comparison 
with the specification may lead to four possible states. 
The first state is that the AIS message was received in 
time. The second possible state is that the AIS 
messages was received prior to the from the 
specification expected update rate. Third the message 
was received late and last the message was not 
received at all.  
G. International Maritime Organization (IMO) – 
Number 
Table 2: Illustration the IMO checksum calculation 
IMO 9 – 0 – 7 – 4 – 7 – 2 – 9  
Weight 7 – 6 – 5 – 4 – 3 – 2 
Verification 7*9 + 6*0 + 5*7 + 4*4 + 3*7 + 
2*2 = 139   -->   139 mod 10 = 9 
 
IMO numbers can be verified by their checksum. 
According to Fluit, 2011[6] the IMO-number contains a 
check digit at the end of the number. The check digit is 
calculated by the preceding digits in the following way. 
Weight the digit with the position and sum all weighted 
digits. The last digit of this sum equals the last digit of 
the IMO number if the IMO number is valid. The 
following example explains the verification scheme. 
IV. DEFAULT AND CRITICAL VALUES 
This section describes the default value as defined 
by the AIS standard (). Furthermore values are signed 
as critical, if applied plausibility of consistency tests are 
not passed. 
We want to note that test criteria are empirical and 
might be incomplete. An overview of all analyzed 
parameters and their definition of critical and default 
values are given in Figure 5. We use the term of 
contained values as the average value between the 
two values of the used AIS messages. 
The SOG value has the default value of 1023[3]. 
We consider the SOG as critical if the contained value 
in the AIS message deviates more than 30% from the 
calculated values. 
The THDG value has the default value of 511[3]. 
We consider the THDG as critical if the difference 
between the contained THDG and the calculated COG 
is larger than 20DEG. This holds only under the 
assumption that current velocities of water  are smaller 
than the vessel speed. But the AIS system does not 
contain any information about the water current.  It 
should take care in the conclusion that it is impossible 
to estimate its influence.  
The IMO number has a default value of 0[3]. We 
consider the IMO number as critical in the case where 
the CHECKSUM, which is calculated as described in 
section 3, of the IMO number is not correct. 
The navigational status has the default value of 
15[3]. We consider the navigational status as critical if 
the contained values states that the vessel is at anchor 
but the calculated speed over ground is larger than 3 
knots. It should be stated that there are possible 
situations in which a vessel is at anchor and moves 
faster than 3 knots but these situation should be rare 
over the total of all vessels at anchor. 
The position is an important parameter since the 
most calculations are based on the position. The 
default values of the position are 108600000 and 
54600000 for the longitude and latitude, respectively[3].  
We consider a position report as critical if the difference 
between two positions reports is larger than 500m. This 
is motivated by the average speed of vessels and the 
specified time difference between two AIS messages 
as discussed in the previous section. 
The update rate is given in the AIS specifications 
and is based on the speed and rate of turn of the 
vessel. We consider the update rate as critical if the 
difference between the received update rate and the 
specified update rate is larger than an empirical chosen 
value of 2 seconds. 
The default value of the ROT is defined as -128[3].  
The calculation of the ROT value is not straight forward 
for the position reports possible and the analysis of the 
time dependent behavior of the ROT value is beyond 
the scope of this paper. Therefore we do not provide a 
definition for a critical ROT value. 
V. RESULTS 
This section describes the results of the analysis 
for the HELCOM data of September 2013 and is 
structured into three parts describing the analysis for a 
single day in the first part followed by the analysis of 
the month and finally estimating the amount of critical 
values for navigation.  
A. Single day analysis 
This section describes the analysis of the COG 
and SOG and update rates as of 13th of September 
2011. The differentiation between harbor and sea areas 
was not applied, to provide a general overview of a 
single day AIS data set. 
Figure 5: This figure show the definitions of AIS default 
and critical values as used throughout this paper 
 1) SOG 
The single day analysis of the 13th of September 2011 
for the speed over ground AIS values shows a small 
lobe with a peak around zero. The histogram (blue 
solid line) in Figure 6 shows the probability on the 
y-axis versus the speed difference between calculated 
and reported values on the x-axis. In addition we plot a 
Gaussian curve (green solid line) with a mean value of 
-0.05 kn and a standard deviation of 0.17 kn. With the 
assumption that the Gaussian distribution represents 
the data, the reported speed over ground corresponds 
to the calculated SOG from two successive positions 
within 0.34 kn (95% confidence level). 
 
2) COG 
The single day analysis of the 13th of September 
2011 for the course over ground AIS values shows a 
small lobe with a peak around zero. The histogram 
(blue solid line) in Figure 7 shows the probability on the 
y-axis versus the course difference between calculated 
and reported values on the x-axis. In addition we plot a 
Gaussian curve (green solid line) with a mean value of 
-0.19 degrees and a standard deviation of 
1.53 degrees. With the assumption that the Gaussian 
distribution represents the data, the reported course 
over ground corresponds to the calculated COG from 
two successive positions within 3.06 degrees (95% 
confidence level). 
 
3) Update rate 
The single day analysis of the update rate shows 
similar behaviour with three interesting areas. The first 
part is the largest peak around 0. These are the 
messages which are received at the time expected 
from the specification. The green solid curve plots a 
Gaussian with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 
1.32s to guide the eye of the reader. The analysis ends 
up with about 87% of the data being within the -6 to 6 
second bin. With the assumption of the Gaussian 
distribution the 95% confidence level is reached for the 
data with 2.6 seconds difference between observed 
and expected update rate. We can conclude that 87% x 
95% = 82% of the received messages are sent within 
2.6 seconds of the specified update rate. 
The peak around -6 seconds (around 5% of all data) is 
most likely caused by wrong ROT values. According to 
table 1 a vessel at the speed between 0 kn and 14 kn 
updates every 10 seconds if not turning and every 
3.333 seconds if turning. This results in a difference of 
10 - 3.33 = 6.67 seconds which is seen in this figure. 
The second largest high at 170s (5% of the data) 
this might be caused by two different effects. First a 
slow moving vessel below 3 knots which is not moored 
but flagged as moored will report every 180s instead of 
10s. Or a moored vessel which should be slower than 3 
knots but in fact is faster than three knots. The latter 
case would indicate a faulty AIS transponder, while the 
former one could be the result of a human error or 
negligence. 
Figure 6: This figure shows the histogram the 
difference between calculated and reported SOG data. 
Figure 8: This figure shows the histogram the 
difference between calculated and reported update 
rate 
Figure 7: This figure shows the histogram the 
difference between calculated and reported COG 
data. 
The additional peaks (less than 1% of the data) 
around the points 10, 20 ,30 ,40 and 50 are most likely 
caused by missed AIS messages. 
B. Monthly analysis 
This section investigates the day to day variations 
of the SOG and COG values during September 2011. 
1) COG: 
Figure 9 shows the difference between the 
calculated and reported COG values during September 
2011 in two areas. The left side shows the Rostock 
harbor while the right side the Baltic Sea. In the graph 
there is no significant difference between the days 
respectively during September. Between the different 
areas there is a small difference in the performance 
visible. The monthly average between calculated and 
reported values is around zero in both cases but the 
calculated standard deviation is slightly lower in the 
Baltic Sea when compared to the harbor. This might be 
explained by the fact that the dynamics, read average 
speed, in the harbor is limited and therefore the 
position accuracy is more important. A distance 
travelled at sea compared to a distance made in the 
harbor during the same period of time is longer. 
2) SOG: 
Figure 10 shows the difference between the 
calculated and reported SOG values in September 
2011 in two areas. The left side shows the Rostock 
harbor while the right side the Baltic Sea. In the graph 
there is no significant difference between the days 
respectively in September. In comparison to the COG 
value there is no difference in the performance visible. 
The monthly average between calculated and reported 
value is around zero for both cases and the calculated 
standard deviation is very similar in both the Baltic Sea 
and the Rostock harbor. 
 
C. Critical or default? 
This part analyzes the performance of navigational 
relevant AIS parameters focusing on default  or critical 
values as defined in section 4. We study the two areas, 
the Baltic Sea and Rostock harbor. 
 
1) Rostock harbor 
The statistical analysis in the Rostock harbor 
shows that out of all received AIS messages 10% are 
default and another 10% are critical. Figure 11 shows 
that the 10% default values are caused by the reported 
THDG (50%) and ROT (50%) data. The critical values 
on the other side show also large contributions from the 
COG (34%) and THDG (44%) data but have additional 
SOG (5%) and Update rate (17%) contributions. 
 
2) Baltic Sea 
The statistical analysis critical and default in the 
traffic separation scheme in the Baltic Sea shows a 
much smaller amount of critical (1%) and default (3%) 
in comparison to the Rostock harbor. Analysing the 
default values in more details reveals the same 
behaviour as in the Rostock harbor. The default values 
are caused by unknown THDG (45%) and ROT (55%) 
values. As shown in Figure 12 the distribution of critical 
values shows that in the Baltic Sea the values Update 
rate (14%), COG (21%), THDG (41%) and SOG (24%) 
contribute equally to the total critical values budget. 
The smaller amount of critical values might be 
explained by the fact that the vessel dynamic is larger 
in the traffic separation area in comparison to the 
Figure 12: Statistical analysis of the AIS messages 
received in the Baltic Sea. 
Figure 11: Statistical analysis of the AIS messages 
received in the Rostock harbor.  
Figure 9: Analysis of the difference between the 
reported and calculated COG values in September 
2011 
Figure 10: Analysis of the difference between the 
reported and calculated SOG values in September 
2011 
harbor and therefore position errors have a smaller 
effect. 
VI. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK 
We can summarize that the AIS messages contain 
on average less than 11% of default values (2.6% in 
the Baltic sea; 10.5% in the Rostock harbor). Additional 
we conclude that AIS message contain on average 
less than 10% of critical values (1.5 in the Baltic sea 
and 9.6% in the Rostock harbor). 
The detailed analysis of the performance of the  
COG value show that 95% of the reported values are 
within 3 degree difference to the calculated ones.  
The same analysis is done for the performance of 
the SOG values and we conclude that 95 % of the 
reported values are consistent with the calculated ones 
within 0.3 knots. 
The analysis of the update rate shows four 
interesting results. First 82% of the update rate are 
within 2.6 seconds of the specified update rate (see 
table 1). Second there are messages which are 
received around 6 seconds early as expected from the 
specification (table 1). Third it exists update rates 
which indicate that there are missing AIS reports. And 
fourth there are messages which have a delay of 170 
seconds which could be explained by wrong 
navigational status. 
What is planned in the future? 
The in this paper performed study analysis the 
total statistics of all vessels and does not investigate 
the behavior of single vessels. To answer the question 
if the critical values are mainly caused by single 
vessels with faulty equipment we are interested to 
analyze the data on a vessel by vessel base. 
Another interesting analysis is to benchmark the 
performance gain of IALA beacon. The AIS message 
contains a flag if the IALA beacon service is used. 
Assuming that this flag is set correctly it is possible to 
separate the database into vessels with IALA beacon 
and analyze the performance of SOC and COG. 
The final goal of this studies focuses on the final 
fusion of Radar and AIS data to improve reliability and 
continuity and generate integrity information for the 
navigational relevant AIS values. 
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